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PAY EQUITY FOR COACHES AND ATHLETIC
ADMINISTRATORS: AN ELEMENT OF TITLE IX?
Barbara Osborne*
Marilyn V. Yarbrough**
In this Article, Professors Osborne and Yarbrough address the issue of gender dis-
crimination in the compensation of coaches and athletic administrators. They
discuss the application of the Equal Pay Act of 1963 and Title VII to pay ineq-
uity claims and conclude that both have proven to be inadequate as a means of
addressing the problem. Professors Osborne and Yarbrough then present Title IX
as a way of countering the problem of gender discrimination in the compensation
of coaches. They also discuss the prospects for gender equality in compensation by
considering several cases addressing the issue. Finally, they offer recommenda-
tions both to help claimants prevail in pay equity claims and to help universities
avoid such claims.
INTRODUCTION
In 1972, Congress passed Title IX of the Education Amend-
ments Act.' Title IX has become known as the champion of equal
opportunity for women in sports. The impact of Title IX has not
been positive for all women in sports, however, particularly female
employees in intercollegiate athletics. Although participation of
girls and women in athletics has dramatically increased, opportuni-
ties for women in athletics-related employment have actually
decreased.2
In 1972, women coached more than ninety percent of women's
teams.3 Today, only forty-seven percent of the coaches of women's
* Assistant Professor, Department of Exercise and Sport Science, University of North
Carolina at Chapel Hill. B.A. cum laude 1982, University of Wisconsin-Parkside; M.Ed. 1989,
Boston University;J.D. 1997, Boston College Law School.
** Professor of Law, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill School of Law. B.A.
1966, Virginia State University; J.D. 1973, University of California at Los Angeles School of
Law.
1. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1994).
2. R. Vivian Acosta & Linda Jean Carpenter, A Longitudinal Study--Nineteen Year Up-
date: 1977-1996, at http://bailiwick.lib.uiowa.edu/ge/Acosta/womensp.html (last visited
Jan. 25, 2001) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform); cf Welch Suggs,
Uneven Progress for Women's Sports, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Apr. 7, 2000, at A52 (describing
annual survey results showing increasing but uneven support for women's athletics).
3. Acosta & Carpenter, supra note 2.
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teams are women, down from forty-nine percent in 1994.' Accord-
ing to a study by R. Vivian Acosta and Linda Jean Carpenter, 6,580
head coaching jobs existed for women's teams in the NCAA in
1996, but women held only 3,138 of those jobs. Although 209
women's teams were added between 1994 and 1996, there was a
net loss of nine female coaches.6 Women are also limited to coach-
ing women's teams--only two percent of head coaches of men's
teams are women.7 Additionally, women hold 61.1% of the 5,902
paid assistant coaching positions for women's teams and 51.3% of
8
unpaid assistant coaching positions for women's teams.
There are several explanations for why women are not getting
or keeping more jobs as coaches. The massive increase in the
number of girls participating in sport and the rapid addition of
women's intercollegiate teams has resulted in a lack of sufficiently
qualified women in the marketplace to fill all available positions. 9
Additionally, because few women had the opportunity to partici-
pate in competitive athletics prior to Title IX, men have long had a
competitive edge in the job market as it relates to coaching expe-
rience.o The lack of female role models in coaching may have
discouraged girls from becoming coaches, as has the long-standing
prejudice of female physical educators against competitive sports
for women." Finally, men who want to coach for men's teams view
coaching women's teams as an entree into the competitive colle-
giate coaching ranks.
12
Female coaches have also had to hurdle the obstacle of the male
athletic director.' 3 Male administrators have historically hired more
men than women: colleges and universities with male athletic di-
rectors have women in forty-six percent of the head coach
positions for women's teams; those with a female athletic director
have women in fifty-six percent of these positions. 14
4. Annelies Knoppers, Gender and the Coaching Profession, in WOMEN, SPORT, AND
CULTURE, 119, 119 (Susan Birrell & Cheryl Cole eds., 1994).




9. Cf id. (cataloging the rapid decrease in the percentage of female coaches, al-
though the absolute number has risen since the passage of Title IX).
10. Cf Knoppers, supra note 4, at 122-26 (analyzing the myriad factors that conspire
to depress job opportunities for female coaches).
11. See id. at 120.
12. Id. at 123.




The employment figures are even worse for women who aspire
to be athletics administrators. Only 18.5% of all women's intercol-
legiate athletics programs are headed by female administrators.
15
There is an average of less than one female administrator per
school within the administration of women's athletics programs,
and 7.4% of Division I programs, 39% of Division II programs, and
28% of Division III programs have no female administrators. '6
Even at the Division I level, women rarely hold policymaking posi-
tions.
For the women who do hold jobs as coaches or administrators in
intercollegiate athletics, there are salary issues to battle. It is well
documented that there is a gender gap in salaries in the United
States; women are paid seventy-six cents for every dollar that men
make. 7 This gender gap widens in college athletics, with women
earning only sixty-two percent of what men make. '8 College ath-
letic programs allocate over sixty-five percent of budget funds
dedicated for salaries to male head coaches of men's sports, and
they allocate seventy-six percent of the funds available for assistant
coaches to men's sports. 19 Coaches of men's teams also receive bet-
ter benefits packages than coaches of women's teams, and other
advantages, such as coaches' broadcasting opportunities and shoe
20contracts, are not readily available for coaches of women's teams.
These trends and figures indicate an overall pattern of gender dis-
crimination in the employment of athletics coaches and
administrators in higher education.
Why does such blatant pay discrimination continue to exist? The
legislation most often relied upon in intercollegiate athletics wage
discrimination cases, the Equal Pay Act of 19632' and Tide VII of
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Donna Leinwand, Women's Salaries: Difference of Pay or Difference of Opinion , GAN-
NErr NEWS SERV., Sept. 7, 1999, available at 1999 WL 6974404.
18. Suggs, supra note 2, at A52.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. The Equal Pay Act (EPA) requires that:
No employer having employees subject to any provisions of this section shall dis-
criminate, within any establishment in which such employees are employed, between
employees on the basis of sex by paying wages to employees in such establishment at
a rate less than the rate at which he pays wages to employees of the opposite sex in
such establishment for equal work on jobs the performance of which requires equal
skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are performed under similar working con-
ditions, except where such payment is made pursuant to (i) a seniority system; (ii) a
merit system; (iii) a system which measures earnings by quantity or quality of produc-
tion; or (iv) a differential based on any other factor other than sex. Provided, that an
employer who is paying a wage rate differential in violation of this subsection shall
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the Civil Rights Acts of 1964,22 have proven to be inadequate pro-
tection against such discrimination. Unfortunately, because of the
lack of success of plaintiffs under these legislative regimes, there is
a dearth of litigation and little that can be interpreted as trends or
23even articulable standards for such litigation.
In October 1997, the United States Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission (EEOC), the agency charged with enforcing
Title IX and the Equal Pay Act, issued a notice entitled Enforcement
Guidance on Sex Discrimination in the Compensation of Sports Coaches in
Educational Institutions2 4 (Guidelines). Observing the significant
disparities between the salaries of coaches of men's intercollegiate
teams and those of women's teams, the EEOC promulgated the
Guidelines in order to set "forth the Commission's position on the
application of the Equal Pay Act and Title VII ... to claims of gen-
der inequity in the compensation of coaches."
25
Under the Guidelines, the actual requirements of the job, rather
26than job titles or descriptions, are determinative. Further, "pay
discrimination cannot be justified if the differences relied on for
the proposition that the two jobs are not substantially equal are
themselves based on discrimination in the terms and conditions of
employment."27 In addition to these general requirements, the
Guidelines address the particularized requirements of the Equal
Pay Act and Title VII separately.
28
not, in order to comply with the provisions of this subsection, reduce the wage rate
of any employee.
29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1) (1994).
22. Title VII of the Civil Rights Acts of 1964 establishes:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-(1) to fail or refuse to
hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individ-
ual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1994).
23. EEOC Notice 915.002, Enforcement Guidance on Sex Discrimination in the Compensation
of Sports Coaches in Educational Institutions, EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH) 5527, at 4456-4467
(Oct. 29, 1997), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/docs/coaches.html [hereinafter EEOC
Guidelines] ("There are only a limited number of cases that apply Title VII and/or the EPA
to questions of pay discrimination in coaching and a number of them either present unique
facts, or, in the Commissioner's view, include incomplete analyses of the law.").
24. Id.
25. Id. at 4456-57.
26. Id. at 4457.
27. Id. at 4457-58.
28. EEOC Guidelines, supra note 23, at 4458, 4466,
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Because the EEOC has no enforcement responsibility for pay
discrimination claims brought by coaches of women's teams on the
basis of anything other than gender inequity, the analysis of the
Guidelines stops there. Further, Title VII and the Equal Pay Act
(EPA) do not address the problem of discrimination against a
male coach of a women's sport who has been discriminated against
because of the sex of the student-athletes he coaches. In that situa-
tion, the plaintiff may be able to rely on Title IX.
While Title IX could be interpreted to reach more broadly than
Title VII and the EPA, courts have generally circumscribed Title
IX's efficacy by importing restrictive standards from those other
statutes.'O The Guidelines are also limited by the underlying stat-
utes, but there is hope that they will influence the courts' narrow
interpretation of these statutes and provide a realistic remedy for
gender discrimination in collegiate coaching. Courts could seek to
effectuate the underlying policy of the Guidelines by interpreting
Title VII, Title IX, and the EPA more generously. While coaches
and administrators should work together to achieve the broad
goals of gender equity, coaches who believe that they have been
discriminated against should carefully choose their claims and an-
ticipate defenses. Likewise, schools should take steps to understand
the law and eliminate gender-biased policies to insulate themselves
from lawsuits.
This Article addresses the issue of gender discrimination in the
compensation of coaches. Part I discusses the application of the
Equal Pay Act of 1963 to claims of gender discrimination in the
form of unequal pay to male and female coaches. Part II considers
the utilization of Tide VII in claims of gender discrimination as
manifested by pay differentials between the salaries of male and
female coaches. Part III presents Title IX as a means for addressing
the problem of gender discrimination in the compensation of
coaches. Part IV discusses the prospects for gender equality in the
salaries of coaches by considering several cases concerning the is-
sue. Finally, Part V offers several recommendations both to help
claimants be successful in bringing a pay equity claim and to help
universities avoid such claims.
29. See, e.g., Stanley v. Univ. of S. Cal., 13 F.3d 1313 (9th Cir. 1994).
Pay Euity
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I. EQUAL PAY ACT OF 1963
The Equal Pay Act prohibits employers from discriminating on
the basis of sex between employees at the same establishment who
perform equal work in equivalent positions under similar working
conditions.30 An employee may have a claim for relief under the
EPA if the employee establishes that the employer pays a lower
wage to an opposite gender counterpart for equal work on a job
that requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and is per-
formed under similar working conditions.3' The burden then shifts
to the employer to justify the wage difference through one of the
defenses enumerated in the Act.3 2 Below are descriptions of each
element and defense and illustrations from coaches' pay cases in
which the issue is whether a particular element or defense has
been proven.
A. Selecting Comparators
The first step for the plaintiff is to identify male and female
comparators whose jobs may be analyzed to determine whether
they are substantially equal.33 The risk for failure in pre-Guidelines
EPA claims most often arose when the plaintiff-coach did not
choose the correct comparator.
The plaintiff must identify at least one specific comparator3 In
other words, the claimant must compare her job and salary to that
of an actual employee of the opposite sex. Coaches of different
sports may be used as comparators.3 6 The plaintiff has the burden
of proving that the jobs are substantially equal.37
30. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1994).
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. EEOC Guidelines, supra note 23, at 4458.
34. See id.
35. Id. (citing Hein v. Oregon Coll. of Educ., 718 F.2d 910, 916, 918 (9th Cir. 1983)
(finding that "the use of a single comparator is not prohibited; if there is more than one
comparator, 'the proper test for establishing a prima facie case in a professional setting
such as that of a college is whether the plaintiff is receiving lower wages than the average of
wages paid to all employees of the opposite sex performing substantially equal work and
similarly situated with respect to any other factors, such as seniority, that affect the wage
scale.'")).




1. Are the Jobs Substantially Equal?-The analysis of whether jobs
are substantially equal is based on four elements: (a) Equal Skills,
(b) Equal Effort, (c) Equal Responsibility, and (d) Equal Working
Conditions." The Guidelines recognize that "[w]hat constitutes
equal skill, equal effort, or equal responsibility [under the Equal
Pay Act] cannot be precisely defined but 'the broad remedial pur-
pose of the law must be taken into consideration.' Accordingly,
insignificant or inconsequential differences do not prevent jobs
from being equal.
3 9
a. Equal Skills-The EPA states that the skills required of each
coach and his or her comparators must be comparable in
"experience, training, education and ability." ° In addition, the
skills "must be measured in terms of the performance require-
ments of the job. 4 1 "[A] dditional training or education or abilities
that are not required to perform the job will not be considered in
determining whether the jobs are substantially equal. 42
In Hein v. Oregon College of Education,43 a female Ph.D. lecturer in
a physical education department, who possessed skills equal to or
greater than a male basketball coach in the department but whose
position consisted entirely of lecturing, could not be compared to
the basketball coach for EPA purposes because a coaching job re-
quires skills that a non-coaching job does not.4 In essence, their
jobs were not substantially equal and the plaintiff failed to prove
an element crucial to her case.
b. Equal Effort-The EEOC looks at the actual job requirements
of the jobs being compared in order to decide whether these jobs
require equal effort.45 This analysis does not have to be limited to
coaches of like sports.46 For example, it is typical for high school
and college coaches to be responsible for teaching/training and
counseling/advising of student athletes, general program
management, budget management, fund-raising, public relations,
and recruiting. If a coach spends approximately the same amount
of time coaching a similar number of athletes, managing
comparable team budgets, organizing fundraisers, and recruiting,
38. Id. at 4458-60.
39. Id. at 4458-59 (quoting29 C.F.R. § 1620.14(a) (2000)).
40. 29 C.F.R. § 1620.15(a) (2000).
41. Id.
42. EEOC Guidelines, supra note 23, at 4459 (citing Hein v. Oregon Coll. of Educ., 718
F.2d 910 (9th Cir. 1983)).
43. 718 F.2d 910 (9th Cir. 1983).
44. Id. at 914, cited in EEOC Guidelines, supra note 23, at 4459 n.15.
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the Guidelines explain that it does not matter if he or she coaches
ice hockey or crew, because the positions would require equal
effort.8
c. Equal Responsibility-The EEOC looks "closely at the actual
duties performed by the coaches to assess whether differences in
responsibility justify unequal pay."49 Regulations promulgated un-
der the EPA state that "[r]esponsibility is concerned with the
degree of accountability required in the performance of the job,
with emphasis on the importance of the job obligation. "5°
"[F] actors relevant to an analysis of responsibility [of coaches] may
include ... the size of the team, the number of assistants, and the
demands of event and media management."51
The job obligations of the comparator positions do not have to
be identical.52 In Brock v. Georgia Southwestern College,53 an employer
attempted to justify paying a female intramural sports coach less
than the male coach of the men's basketball team by arguing that
she had less responsibility because she had a smaller budget and
did not have to arrange off-campus games.54 The court recognized,
however, that the female coach also had scheduling and budgetary
responsibilities and found that the two positions were substantially
equal.5
In the absence of proof of equal responsibility, however, the
Guidelines state that "the Commission will examine whether the
institution has afforded male and female coaches the opportunity
to take on responsibilities in a nondiscriminatory fashion."56 For
example, the Guidelines state that "if an educational institution
has discriminated against a female head coach by failing to provide
her with comparable assistant coaching support to what it provides
to a male head coach, it cannot justify paying her a lower salary
based on the claim that she has a less responsible position."57
d. Similar Working Conditions-The EPA assumes that
"employees performing jobs requiring equal skill, effort, and re-
sponsibility are likely to be performing them under similar
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. 29 C.F.R. § 1620.17(a) (2000).
51. EEOC Guidelines, supra note 23, at 4459-60.
52. Id. at 4459.
53. 765 F.2d 1026 (11th Cir. 1985).
54. Id. at 1035, cited in EEOC Guidelines, supra note 23, at 4459.
55. Id., cited in EEOC Guidelines, supra note 23, at 4459.
56. EEOC Guidelines, supra note 23, at 4460.
57. Id.
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working conditions."-8 However, disproportionate pressure to win
or generate revenue has been successfully used in cases to show
differences in working conditions for coaches. 9
If the complainant has proved his or her prima facie case by se-
lecting the appropriate comparators, by demonstrating that the
jobs are equal, and by demonstrating that the plaintiff earns less in
wages than his or her counterpart, then the burden shifts to the
defendant to prove affirmative defenses to the allegations.60
In Wallace v. Board of Regents, 6' a male coach alleged violations of
the Equal Pay Act and Title VII where, after he was fired from his
coaching position for NCAA violations, his female replacement
received higher pay than he had previously received. The court
dismissed Wallace's claim because he had not established a prima
facie case on his EPA and Title VII claims. Specifically, his female
replacement's non-coaching duties at the university were very dif-
ferent from those that he had while he worked there; for this
reason, there was no evidence that Wallace had been intentionally
discriminated against merely because the university paid his re-
63placement a higher salary.
B. Affirmative Defenses
To successfully oppose a claim under the EPA, the defendant
has to demonstrate that his or her conduct falls into one of the
exceptions to the Act. The EPA allows differential pay if it is based
on: "(i) a seniority system; (ii) a merit system; (iii) a system which
measures earnings by quantity or quality of production; or (iv) a
differential based on any other factor other than sex."64 If the em-
ployer-in our context, the college or university-satisfies the
65burden of proving an affirmative defense, the defendant prevails.
The "factor other than sex" defense has proven quite successful
for Equal Pay Act defendants. 66 It is important to note that "an em-
ployer who uses this defense must show that the factor of sex is not
58. 29 C.F.R. § 1620.18(b) (2000).
59. Stanley v. Univ. of S. Cal., 13 F.3d 1313, 1321 (9thCir. 1994).
60. EEOC Guidelines, supra note 23, at 4460-61.
61. 967 F. Supp. 1287, 1292 (S.D. Ga. 1997).
62. Id. at 1295.
63. Id.
64. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1) (1994).
65. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (2) (h) (1994); EEOC Guidelines, supra note 23, at 4465-
66.
66. See infra Part I.B.1-6.
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an element underlying the wage differential either expressly or by
implication."67 The following justifications have been asserted by
educational institutions to justify paying male coaches more than
comparable female coaches:
(a) the male coach produces more revenue for the school
than the female coach; (b) the male coach must be paid
higher wages in order to compete for him; (c) salary is based
on prior salary; (d) salary is linked to the sex of the stu-
dent-athletes rather than the sex of the coach; (e) the male
coach has superior experience, education, and ability; and (f)
the male coach has more duties.68
1. Revenue as a Factor Other than Sex-Historically, courts have
allowed this argument as a defense to claims of pay inequity, con-
struing the expectation and pressure to generate revenue as an
additional responsibility that justifies pay differences.69 The Guide-
lines caution, however, that revenue is affected by many variables,
many of which are "not within an institution's direct control."
70
The EEOC further recognizes that "women's athletic programs
historically and currently receive considerably less [sic] resources
than men's programs."71 Thus,
the Commission will carefully analyze an asserted defense that
the production of revenue is a factor other than sex to de-
termine whether the institution has provided discriminatorily
reduced support to a female coach to produce revenue for
her team. If this is the case, it would constitute discrimination
in the terms and conditions of employment which cannot
then be used to justify a pay disparity under the EPA.72
Accordingly, the Guidelines suggest that judges should carefully
scrutinize claims that revenue production is an acceptable justifica-
tion for salary differential and examine that defense within the
67. EEOC Guidelines, supra note 23, at 4461.
68. Id.
69. See, e.g., Stanley v. Univ. of S. Cal., 13 F.3d 1313, 1323 (9th Cir. 1994), cited in
EEOC Guidelines, supra note 23, at 4461 n.26; Bartges v. UNC-Charlotte, 908 F. Supp. 1312,
1327 (W.D.N.C. 1995), cited in EEOC Guidelines, supra note 23, at 4461 n.26; Deli v. Univ.
of Minnesota, 863 F. Supp. 958, 961 (D. Minn. 1994), cited in EEOC Guidelines, supra note
23, at 4461 n.26.
70. EEOC Guidelines, supra note 23, at 4461.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 4461-62.
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context of past discrimination to see if there is equality of
opportunity for the coach of the women's team to generate reve-
73
nue sources.
Traditionally, men's revenue producing sports are supported by
a full cast of sports information and marketing specialists who ac-
tually do the work that creates the revenue.74 Although the courts
have not yet come to this conclusion, it could be argued that the
position of coach of a women's team is actually more difficult be-
cause she is likely to have more personal responsibility for
promoting her team.
2. Marketplace as a Factor Other than Sex-Employers have as-
serted this defense by basing the pay differential on marketplace
value. Many educational institutions have argued that a coach for a
men's team must be paid higher wages than the coach for a
women's team in order to compete for the former.75 The EEOC
has indicated, however, that it distinguishes between arguments
about marketplace value and market rate. 76 The EEOC rejects the
market rate defense because it "is based on the employer's assump-
tion that women are available for employment at lower rates of pay
due to market factors such as the principle of supply and de-
mand."77 The market exists within a society, and because of this the
marketplace may be tainted by past discrimination. As noted
above, on average, women earn seventy-six percent of men's wages
throughout society. 7 The EEOC remarks:
The marketplace value defense is not gender-based but rather
is based on the employer's consideration of an individual's
value in setting wages. Such consideration will qualify as a fac-
tor other than sex only if the employer can demonstrate that
it has assessed the marketplace value of the particular indi-
vidual's job-related characteristics, and any salary discrepancy
is not based on sex.79
3. Employee's Prior Salary as a Factor Other than Sex-The salary
that an employee demands based on his or her prior salary has
been used successfully in court as a justification for a pay
73. See id.
74. Id. at 4461-62 nn. 28-30.
75. Id. at 4463.
76. Id.
77. Id. (citations omitted).
78. Leinwand, supra note 17.
79. EEOC Guidelines, supra note 23, at 4463 (citations omitted).
Pay Equity
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differential,80 and the logic would seem consistent with the
acceptance of the marketplace justification for a pay differential.
The Guidelines urge courts not to accept the employee's prior
salary as a factor other than sex because wages in athletics
programs are not subject to normal market pressures, but are
artificially inflated by non-economic factors such as cultural and
social bias.8' This is particularly true because, as noted above,
women have been almost completely prevented from competing
for the higher paying positions in men's revenue producing
sports.
82
According to the Guidelines, if the employer asserts the argu-
ment that the employee's prior salary is a factor other than sex,
evidence should be obtained as to whether the employer:
1) consulted with the employee's previous employer to de-
termine the basis for the employee's starting and final
salaries; 2) determined that the prior salary was an accurate
indication of the employee's ability based on education, ex-
perience, or other relevant factors; and 3) considered the
prior salary, but did not rely solely on it in setting the em-
ployee's current salary.3
4. Sex of Athletes as a Factor Other than Sex-The Guidelines indi-
cate that "the Commission will not accept as a defense that the sex
of the student-athlete is a factor other than sex justifying a salary
disparity since it is not a gender-neutral factor." 4 It is explicitly a
factor that depends on sex! This eliminates an obstacle for male
coaches of women's teams who traditionally have been unable to
bring a pay discrimination claim based upon the gender of the ath-
letes coached rather than the sex of the coach .
5. Superior Experience, Education, and Ability as a Factor Other than
Sex-It is fairly easy to see how superior qualifications can justify a
pay differential, whether comparing coaches of the same or differ-
ent gender. Courts should determine whether the additional
experience, education, or ability is relevant to the job; if it is not,
80. Id. at 4462-64.
81. Id. at 4464.
82. See Acosta & Carpenter, supra note 2.
83. EEOC Guidelines, supra note 23, at 4464.
84. Id.
85. Cf Deli v. Univ, of Minnesota, 863 F. Supp. 958, 961 (D. Minn. 1994)
(exemplifying a typical pre-Guidelines case that limited recovery under the Equal Pay Act to
situations where discrimination is based on the gender of the claimant).
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pay differentials should not be allowed.8 6 These determinations are
made on a case by case basis.
In Harker v. Utica College of Syracuse University,87 although the
plaintiff made a prima facie showing of discrimination, the court
dismissed the claim on the grounds that the plaintiff failed to re-
but the defendant's reasoning behind its pay disparity. The court
approved of the defendant's reasons for paying a female coach of
the women's basketball team less than a male coach of the
women's team where the disparity was due to differences in educa-
tion, experience, and length of service. 88
6. Additional Duties as a Factor Other than Sex-It is logical to pay
someone more if they do more work. An employer cannot pay
higher wages if the opportunity to take on additional responsibili-
ties is offered in a discriminatory manner, however. 9
II. TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964
Because the Equal Pay Act was an inadequate tool to correct pay
disparity for coaches and athletics administrators before the
Guidelines, many plaintiffs sought relief under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964.90 Most claims that may be brought under
the EPA may also be brought under Tide VII. Title VII is more re-
strictive than the EPA in that it applies only to employers with
fifteen or more employees, working twenty or more weeks per
year, whose organizations impact interstate commerce.9' At the
same time, Tide VII is broader than the EPA because it deals with
more than equal pay for equal jobs. As noted by the EEOC, "Tide
VII covers types of wage discrimination not covered by the EPA.
Even where jobs do not satisfy the 'equal work' requirement of the
EPA, a claim may be made under Tide VII."
92
86. See EEOC Guidelines, supra note 23, at 4465 (providing contrasting examples in
which additional experiences would or would not be relevant to the job, and therefore
could or could not be the basis of additional pay).
87. 885 F. Supp. 378, 389 (N.D.N.Y. 1995).
88. Id.
89. EEOC Guidelines, supra note 23, at 4465 ("The school cannot offer men and
women coaches the opportunity to take on additional duties in a discriminatory way and
then use the discriminatory distribution of duties tojustify disparate pay.").
90. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994).
91. Id. § 2000e(b).
92. EEOC Guidelines, supra note 23, at 4466.
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Under Title VII, it is unlawful for an employer:
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or
otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to
his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of em-
ployment, because of such individual's race, color, religion,
sex or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants
for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to
deprive any individual of employment opportunities or oth-
erwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of
such individual's race, color, religion, sex or national origin. 3
The EEOC Guidelines provide an example:
[T]he male coaches of the men's baseball and ice-hockey
teams receive bonuses for winning seasons while none of the
female coaches of the women's teams receive bonuses for
winning seasons. Even if the jobs are not substantially equal, it
is unlawful for an employer to give men and women different
benefits unless it can show that the difference is not based on
94
sex.
To file an employment discrimination suit under Title VII, the
plaintiff must establish: 1) the plaintiff is a member of a protected
class, 2) the plaintiff was qualified for a particular position, 3) de-
spite the plaintiff's qualifications, he or she was treated less
favorably than an opposite gender counterpart, and 4) the circum-
stances gave rise to an inference of discrimination. 95 In County of
Washington v. Gunther,96 the Supreme Court held that persons alleg-
ing sex-based wage discrimination are not precluded from
bringing a Title VII claim where they are unable to show that their
jobs are equal to higher-paid positions held by the opposite sex;
that is, the "equal work" requirement of the Equal Pay Act is inap-
plicable in Title VII claims.97
After the plaintiff has proven her prima facie case, the burden
shifts to the defendant to show legitimate nondiscriminatory rea-
93. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
94. EEOC Guidelines, supra note 23, at 4466.
95. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 792 U.S. 792,802 (1973).
96. 452 U.S. 161,181 (1981).
97. EEOC Guidelines, supra note 23, at 4466.
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sons for the pay differential.98 If the defendant institution offers a
legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the pay differential, the
burden then shifts back to the plaintiff to establish that the institu-
tion's articulated reason was merely a pretext for discrimination."
As is the case when suing under the EPA, Title VII does not ad-
dress the problem of the man who is paid substantially less because
he coaches a women's sport, not because of his own sex.
III. TITLE IX OF THE EDUCATION AMENDMENTS ACT OF 1972
Title IX of the Education Amendments Act of 1972 was in-
tended to eliminate discrimination based on sex in education. Not
until the formal regulations were promulgated and policy interpre-
tations adopted in 1979 were athletics clearly protected by Title
IX.'00 A few years later, the United States Supreme Court dealt
women seeking opportunities in athletics programs a nearly fatal
blow with their decision in Grove City College v. Bell,'O° which held
that Title IX was program-specific and applied only to programs
that actually received federal funds. In other words, if the chemis-
try department in an institution received federal funds, but the
athletic department did not, Title IX was inapplicable to the ath-
letic department. The legislation was not a viable legal vehicle for
change again until 1988 when Congress enacted the Civil Rights
Restoration Act, expressly providing that Title IX encompasses all
facets of a university that receives any federal financial assistance in
any of its programs.102
Title IX is enforced by the Office for Civil Rights of the U.S. De-
partment of Education. 0 3 It may be the most effective means of
98. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1994) (noting that the affirmative defenses of
the Equal Pay Act would suffice to show nondiscriminatory reasons for the pay differen-
tial)).
99. Id. at 4466 n.46 (citing St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 507
(1993)).
100. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs and Activities
Receiving or Benefiting from Federal Financial Assistance, 45 C.F.R. § 86.1 (2000).
101. 465 U.S. 555, 574-75 (1984).
102. Janet Judge et al., Pay Equity: A Legal and Practical Approach to the Compensation of
College Coaches, 6 SETON HALLJ. SPORT L. 549, 557 (1996) (citingCivil Rights Restoration Act
of 1987, 20 U.S.C. § 1687 (1994)).
103. See Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities
Receiving Federal Financial Assistance, 34 C.F.R. § 106.1-3 (2000) (giving the Assistant
Secretary for Civil Rights of the Department of Education the power to determine what
remedial actions should be taken to overcome the effects of sex based discrimination).
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litigating a pay discrimination case involving coaches of women's
teams.
The Department of Education recognizes the compensation of
coaches as a factor in determining whether athletic programs are
in compliance with Title IX.' °4 The Department's Policy Interpreta-
tion'05 states that a violation of the statute will be found if the
compensation practices of the university result in differential pay
for male and female athletes' coaches of equal quality, nature, or
availability. The Policy Interpretation lists possible factors that may be
determinative of this issue.'0 6 These factors may justify compensation
disparities where valid differences in skill, effort, responsibility, and
working conditions are present. °7 However, the Policy Interpretation
also acknowledges that in special situations, an employee's stellar
record may justify a high salary." s
IV. PROSPECTS FOR GENDER EQUITY IN ATHLETICS
Over the past two decades, litigation for gender equity in the
athletics workplace has had several successes, both large and small.
For some time, the courts wavered over whether Title VII pro-
vided the exclusive remedy for individuals alleging employment
discrimination on the basis of sex in federally funded education
institutions, thereby preempting similar claims brought under Ti-
tle IX."° Differences in "administrative, procedural, and
exhaustion requirements" and the fact that Title IX actions have
no damages cap made this an important consideration. "0 The
United States Supreme Court settled the issue in North Haven Board
of Education v. Bell,"' ruling that the legislative history of Title IX
supported a finding that employment discrimination falls within
the scope of Title IX and is therefore compensable under that leg-
islative scheme. Thus, the Bell decision gave plaintiffs a potent
arrow to add to their quiver of gender equity claims.
104. '34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c)(6) (2000).
105. 44 Fed. Reg. 71,413, 71,416 (Dec. 11, 1979) (codified at 45 C.F.R. § 86).
106. Id. Factors may include: (1) the range and nature of the duties, (2) the experience
of individual coaches, (3) the number of participants for particular sports, (4) the number
of assistant coaches supervised, and (5) the level of the competition. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. SeeJudge et al., supra note 102, at 559 (collecting illustrative cases).
110. Id.
111. 456 U.S. 512, 529-30 (1981).
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Further, while college coaches have often been thwarted in their
attempts to achieve gender equity, courts have been more willing
to acknowledge sex discrimination in the employment of college
professors, high school teachers, and high school coaches. For in-
stance, in Burkey v. Marshall County Board of Education,"' which
involved a high school teacher, the court struck down a school
board policy requiring that all female coaches be paid half the sal-
ary of male coaches regardless of the sport they coached. The
school board was ordered to give equal pay to female coaches." '
The court also ordered the board to allow female coaches to su-
pervise boys' teams."" Courts have been much more reluctant to
award remedies to intercollegiate coaches who challenge pay dif-
ferentials." 5 Instead, the prevailing view is that the wage
differentials between intercollegiate sport coaches are just part of
the cultural context."
6
There have been other small successes for gender equity claim-
ants. Recently, in Stanley v. University of Southern California,17
although the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of
summary judgment on all claims in favor of the university, the
court decided to reverse an order requiring the claimant to pay
litigation costs of $48,000 because it would deter others from
bringing sex discrimination suits. This refusal to award litigation
costs was, in itself, a small battle won in the large war on gender
discrimination.
A larger success resulted from the litigation in Lowrey v. Texas
A&M University System,"8 where a female coach was demoted as a
means of retaliation against plaintiffs participation on a gender
equity task force that identified violations of Titles VII and IX at
Tartleton University, a school in the Texas A&M university system.
The Fifth Circuit held that an individual could assert a private
cause of action for retaliation under Title IX." 9 However, the court
spoke only to this narrow issue and remanded the rest of the deci-
sion to the district court. 20 The remanded case survived summary
112. 513 F. Supp. 1084,1097 (N.D.W. Va. 1981).
113. Id. at 1096.
114. Id.
115. Judge et al., supra note 102, at 560-73 (examining Stanley v. Univ. of S. Cal., 13
F.3d 1313 (9th Cir. 1994); Brock v. Georgia S.W. Coll., 765 F.2d 1026 (11th Cir. 1985); Hein
v. Oregon Coll. of Educ., 718 F.2d 910 (9th Cir. 1983); Deli v. Univ. of Minn., 863 F. Supp.
958 (D. Minn. 1994)).
116. Id. at 573-75.
117. 178 F.3d 1069, 1080 (9th Cir. 1999).
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judgment on the Title VII and Title IX claims and will be one of




The EPA and Title VII have not been effective in eliminating
pay discrimination in athletics employment. Tide IX has the po-
tential to be broader reaching and therefore more effective, but
courts have generally limited Title IX by importing restrictive
standards from the EPA and Title VII. Despite the outcome of
some of these cases, coaches have hope under the EEOC Guide-
lines. The Guidelines hold the most promise for plaintiffs as they
specifically address many of the common defenses used in pay dis-
crimination cases and increase the burden of the defendants in
justifying pay disparities. For instance, a court using the Guidelines
in Stanley2 2 might have required the university to prove that the
comparator coach's additional experience was relevant to his ac-
tual coaching duties.
A female coach can take measures to enhance her chances of
winning a pay discrimination claim. In delicate situations like pay
disparity claims, the old adage, "knowledge is power," applies. The
following recommendations include helpful tips for female
coaches:
1. It is important to select the correct legislative
scheme under which to bring suit. If a coach has a
pay disparity claim and can provide an appropriate
comparator, the Equal Pay Act might afford the
greatest possibility of success. If pay disparity relates
to bonuses or other compensation, Tide VII might
be a better choice.
2. Care should be taken to select appropriate com-
parators in an Equal Pay Act claim. Part-time
coaches should be careful to choose part-time com-
parators. Similarly, the size of the team coached,
the size of the coaching staff supervised, and the
121. Lowrey v. Texas A&M Univ. Sys., 11 F. Supp. 2d 895, 909 (S.D. Tex. 1998)
(denying the university's motion for summary judgment concerning Lowrey's claims of pay
discrimination under Title VII and the Equal Pay Act).
122. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
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education and experience of the comparator sport
should be similar.
3. Coaches should familiarize themselves with the
policies and procedures of the university that could
be used as valid affirmative defenses. Gender neu-
tral policies related to seniority, merit, and quantity
or quality of production would generally negate a
pay discrimination claim.
4. Negotiation and discussion of pay differential con-
cerns may bring about resolution without the need
for legal action and the resulting embarrassment to
the institution and loss of privacy for the claimant.
There are also measures that a university can take to prevent pay
disparity problems in the first place. Female coaches and university
counsel can be instrumental in suggesting possible measures to
avoid pay disparity issues. Female coaches and administrators
should be included in the development and implementation of the
university's policies and procedures regarding pay. Janet Judge
and her colleagues have established guidelines to help a university
avoid pay equity claims:
1. The university and the athletic department must
know the prohibitions and requirements of the
equal pay and anti-discrimination laws and regula-
tions that apply to its workplace.
2. Knowledge of the laws must be translated into em-
ployment practices and procedures that comply
with the law, particularly at the hiring and firing
stages.
3. Athletic administrators must be trained in how to
avoid and spot violations of equal pay and discrimi-
nation laws.
4. Athletic administrators must have an effective in-
ternal grievance procedure that encourages
employees to voice their complaints to employer
representatives before going to a lawyer or an out-
side agency.
5. The university and the athletic department must
have clear and strong written policies against illegal
discrimination.
Pay Euity
Univerity of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
6. The university and the athletic department must
conduct regular compliance checks to make sure
that procedures and personnel comport with the
laws, including any new legal developments.
12 3
Another way to prevent pay disparity problems for universities
would be to make the duties and responsibilities of coaches ex-
plicit in their job descriptions and contracts. 4 "This approach can
be achieved through the use of [a] comprehensive and detailed
contract .... [T] his would entail the development of a base con-
tract which covers the traditional duties of a coach, along with a
second contract setting forth additional duties, expectations and
compensation." 125 This type of contracting allows an administrator
to better assess the similarities and differences of the work between
and among the coaches under her direction, 26 and thus can en-
sure that pay disparities are based upon legitimate factors.
CONCLUSION
Current legislation has not provided an adequate solution for
pay discrimination in intercollegiate athletics. Title IX and the re-
cent EEOC Guidelines offer a broader opportunity to litigate
gender inequity claims. However, matters such as discrimination
against female athletics administrators and pay discrimination




Pay discrimination claims are serious issues and pay disparity is-
sues between male and female coaches are now in the spotlight.
The government, the media, and the courts are taking note of the
changing atmosphere at colleges and universities. It can no longer
be taken for granted that male and female coaches should receive
different compensation because of the revenue generated by their
sport. The framework of Title IX implies that it should not be ac-
ceptable for women working in athletics to be treated differently
from their male counterparts.
It would be in everyone's best interest if the different interest
groups worked together to address this problem. If they do not,
123. Judge et al., supra 102, at 577-78.
124. Id. at 576-77.
125. Id. at 576.
126. Id. at 577.
127. See supra Parts I-III.
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more lawsuits will likely appear on the horizon. But if the universi-
ties, athletics administrations, and coaches work together to erode
gender-based pay disparity between coaches, then perhaps true
equality between male and female coaches will not simply be a
theoretical concept.

